The Daily Incite - January 9, 2008
January 09, 2008 - Volume 3, #3
Good Morning:
Over the holidays, we got to spend some time with my brother-in-law and
his family - including my 7-month old niece. Babies are a lot of fun,
as
long as you can give them back when they start to fuss or decide that
it's cool to start their day at 2 AM. As my own kids get older, there
are times when I miss the days when they didn't talk, didn't walk and
for the most part, minded their own business.
Now a favorite pastime for my girls is to
bicker. You know the sweet sound of chatting, then annoyance, and then
outright rage - which usually accompanies crying, screaming, and for
the last few weeks - fighting. Bickering is cute (in a weird way)
because the girls are actually learning an important lesson. They need
to be able to deal with frustration and handle issues in a more
positive
fashion.
At some point (unless Pavlov was wrong), they'll figure out that
screaming at each other isn't really productive and by calmly
discussing the issue - they'll be able to come to a common ground. Or
maybe they can actually agree to disagree. Of
course, they may be 30 by the time this happens, but I'm confident it
will happen.
When the girls start to bicker at home - it's not an issue. We
separate them and the behavior usually stops. Yet, when you are on a
road trip and separating them means, well you can't, you're kind of
hosed. That's when I put in the other ear plug of my iPod and wait for
the storm to blow over. Too bad the Boss doesn't have that option.
Maybe for the next trip, we should bring her iPod along as well. I'll
call that the Ostrich parenting method. Turn up your iPod and hope the
problem goes away. Or at a minimum that no one ends up in the hospital.
This got me thinking about bickering in our work lives.
Having spent far too many years doing battle to get my way, I'm pretty
sure that inflicting your will on everyone else you work with is a
recipe for disaster. Especially in a security role. You can certainly
be Dr. No, and bicker with everyone that wants to open up a port on the
firewall or roll out a new application or let those pesky contractors
in to the applications from wherever they may reside or even build an
integrated business process with a trading partner.
What you'll find is that you quickly lose your credibility and then the
operations folks will go around you and do it anyway. That's when you
know it's time to pack up camp and set up your tepee somewhere else.
Sometimes they "forget" to consult the security folks before rolling
out a major initiative. Most of the time it's very intentional. If you
make their life harder, they'll ask for forgiveness, not permission.
So the next time you find yourself bickering with a colleague over
something minor, think about how those actions are impacting your
credibility. It takes you years to be invited into the conversation,
and you can blow up all that hard work with one ill-advised NO.
Have a great day.
The Dutch Couple image originally uploaded
by billbarber1
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Top Security News
Hopefully
there was a crisis communications reserve...
So what? -
It came to light yesterday that yet another of the "Hacker Safe"
certified web sites was compromised and private data stolen. This time is was Geeks.com. But
isn't that certification indicative that the site is actually "Hacker
Safe?" Yeah right. Nothing is safe from a determined and talented bad
guy. And I've always thought these web site testing services set the
wrong expectation for customers. And McAfee laid down a cool 50 big
(that's $50 million for those not familiar with Incite lingo) to buy
access to that market. Hopefully they also built in the cost of some
extra PR
spin-meisters to deal with these situations, which will inevitably
happen. ScanAlert (the company that provides the Hacker Safe service)
is blaming the customer, which is always a good customer retention
tactic, by saying their certification was revoked a number of times in
the last year when they found vulnerabilities. HUH?!?!? I wonder how
many of ScanAlert's customers pass the certification EVERY SINGLE DAY?
If it's a lot, then the scans are not very rigorous, now are they? And
even when the customer does address the issue, ScanAlert has no way
to know if their systems were compromised when they "weren't
certified." So the web site then proudly displays their little
date-stamped image, while the bad guys are running roughshod over the
database and stealing data. That's why you need to monitor your own
financials and credit accounts (as Security
Mike says) because don't believe that anything is really "Hacker Safe."
Link to this
The NAC customer sat tactic
So what? -
This week's NAC shill newsletter on NetworkWorld brings up an
interesting point, which is how to introduce the technology into an environment,
especially when it's likely that a large percentage of machines will
fail the endpoint checks. That was the case at Columbia University
Medical Center, who did a NAC pilot and turned on blocking. So all
those
devices that weren't up to snuff with the latest patches and up to date
AV, were bounced from the network. User unhappiness ensued, which is
shocking. NOT. Tim Greene's point is that it's
probably a better idea to run the device in monitoring mode initially
and have some way to notify those offending devices that they'll be
bounced out of the network if they don't fix their stuff. Of course,
having up to date AV and patches doesn't mean a machine is actually
clean, but there is a better chance of that than if the machines aren't
up to date. Which brings us to the next topic, the inevitable NAC
fallout has started. Caymas went belly-up last year and now it seems Vernier is relaunching as something else.
We saw FireEye take a similar tactic in starting initially as a NAC
vendor and then quickly spinning their stuff as new IPS-type stuff. Of
course, the NAC-sters will come running to the defense of the market
and say those are execution problems, not market problems - and they'll
be partially right (so you can give your fingers a rest Shimmy). But
not entirely right. NAC disappointed in 2007 and will also suffer more
of a shake-out this year. Yes, that's a preview of my 2008 Incite on
NAC.
Link to this
Understanding open source
business models
So what? -
In one of my 2008 prediction pieces I mention the fact that a
lot of emerging security technology will happen via open-source. So
what? What does that have to do
with an end user, since I'm supposed to be writing from the perspective
of the practitioners out there? It turns out that every time you buy
something, you are implicitly validating the vendor's business model.
I'm sure you still have some road rash scars of making a big
commitment to some bubbleicious technology back in 1998 that went
belly up because it turns out making a profit is kind of important. So
end users need to think about open source as well. This piece in
InformationWeek lays out the 5 main business models inherent to open
source. It's stuff you already know, but probably haven't
thought about it in this context. Is there an open source alternative
to what you are buying? Does it make sense to cut your teeth on that?
What are the operational impacts and TCO metrics to that path? You very
well may end up buying the commercial product since having an appliance
or support may be important to the bigger picture. But at least you are
asking the question before you write the check.
Link to this
The Laundry List
- More good news for public security companies in Q4. Websense announces a better than expected quarter. Ah, the game of tamping down expectations to make things look better is alive and well. - AP coverage
- Hardware-based encryption and innovation in the same sentence? Not so much. Many of the laptop encryption products mentioned in this article actually are hardware-independent. - SearchSecurity coverage
- Note to self, sending a price quote three times what the customer was told doesn't go over very well. - Stuart King's Blog
- If you had any doubt that the virtualization layer is yet another O/S to protect, forget it. VMWare issues a major patch. Hopefully it takes them less time to figure out how to aggressively fix their issues (and maybe even come clean about it). - SearchSecurity.com blog
Top Blog Postings
Sticking
your head in the sand is not an answer
Kurt Wismer went on a tirade at the expense of RSnake last week
regarding the Snake's "contest" to see who could write the smallest XSS
proof of concept worm. Kurt thinks that this is going to uncover an
attack that wouldn't have been discovered otherwise and that's a bad
thing. That we shouldn't trust these researchers because they think
like hackers. Hoff asks for our opinions on this,
and here is mine. Kurt is wrong. Very wrong. He is reflective of old
security thinking. The type of thinking that needs to be
exterminated quickly and ruthlessly. One of the statements that usually
gets the most laughs in my public pitches is that "the bad guys don't
sign a code of ethics." My point is that in all likelihood they are
working on smaller footprint and more innovative XSS attacks and they
are going to figure stuff out. Then they are going to use it against
us. There is a real economic incentive to do
so for them, so they will. So we need to engage in similar tactics to
understand the attack surface and protect our stuff. How will we defend
ourselves if we aren't doing similar research? Kurt's entire argument
is based on the assumption that the bad guys aren't going to figure the
stuff out anyway. I don't like to make assumptions. That's how
you get
hurt. If anything, you assume the bad guys already know how to do this,
and work that much harder to find defenses against these new attacks.
But playing the ostrich game and hoping the problem goes away doesn't
work very well.
http://anti-virus-rants.blogspot.com/2008/01/ethical-conflict-in-webappsec-domain.html
Link
to this
Those that violate policy must pay
LonerVamp highlights a post from Microsoft's Mark Russinovich (original post here) about how Mark
has skirted Microsoft's internal policies to allow autoplay to run on
his corporate machine, so he can do some demos to show some new Vista
capabilities. There are a couple of underlying themes here. First, it
goes to show that GPO's can still be rendered useless by a savvy
technologist with local admin privileges. It's an interesting
post to
see how Mark figured out what the issues were and how he configured his
machine to lock out the GPO update from changing the setting. Is this
acceptable behavior? I don't think so. If he knowingly
violated corporate policies, then there should be
some kind of penalty. What kind of example is that to set for the tens
of millions of other Microsoft customers that actually depend on GPO to
maybe enforce the policies? AutoPlay is bad mojo and should be turned
off (another Security Mike tactic). If this demo is so absolutely
critical, he should do it on a different machine. Or do it in a
virtualization environment on his corporate machine, so the other VM
wouldn't connect to the Microsoft domain (and therefore not be subject
to the policy). But don't just ignore the policies. Or get a sanctioned
rider from the IT folks to say it's cool. Or tell them why that policy
may not make any sense. Yes, that takes time and is a pain in the ass.
If we security folks are supposed to lead by example, it means we have
to eat our own dog food, even if it's inconvenient sometimes.
http://www.terminal23.net/2008/01/irony_in_local_admins_circumve.html
Link
to this
The category auto-generator is
working over time
I've come down on the term "Security Risk Management" pretty
ferociously over the past year because it doesn't mean anything. Or
maybe it means everything. Now Symantec is talking about their big
compliance story using the term "IT Security Compliance." And they talk
about 3 easy steps to get there. Of course, all of this stuff is
totally obvious, but it gives the Big Yellow a way to introduce a new
graphic and process (Define - Control - Govern) to stay on the right
side of the regulators. Of course, it involves buying a lot of stuff in
yellow boxes to "automate" the process. Again, I think this is an
bass-akwards way of looking at the problem. As opposed to starting with
the regulations and figuring out your control needs, why don't you
actually figure out how to protect your data and resources. I can
assure you that all the regulations were built to do that, so if you do
a good job at this protection - you are very likely to be compliant. I
guess it'll be another year of tilting at the compliance windmill with
my Security FIRST messages.
http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2008/01/it_security_compliance_what_ar.html
Link
to this
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