The Daily Incite - January 10, 2008
January 10, 2008 - Volume 3, #4
Good Morning:
I've been very resistant to doing a podcast. I'm not exactly sure why,
but I guess it's because I don't really listen to any - so I can't
imagine anyone would listen to mine. Honestly, I find most podcasts to
be crappy. They are long, drawn out, and generally a waste of time. Not
all, but most. I also don't have the patience to sit and listen to an
hour of anything, besides music.
I've heard more than once
that audio would be a great venue for me. I've been told my voice and
speaking style is "unique," which I always figured meant crappy. I do
lots of webcasts and try to relay a passion for what I do and I try to
be entertaining and kind of wacky. I know how boring it is to
listen to streamed audio over your lunch break, so the least I can do
is try to make it fun. But do I want to do this a couple of times a
month? That's the real question.
There is precedent for this. I've been doing a podcast and feature
article for eBizQ (called the Mike
Rothman Security Report, if you haven't heard it) for a
couple of months and it's been fun. It's trivial to record the audio on
my Mac (Skype + AudioHijackPro = easy) and the sound quality has proven
to be pretty good.
So I'm going to give podcasting a try. The first Pragmatic CSO podcast
will appear tomorrow. It will be short (10 minutes max), sweet and
hopefully entertaining. I'll still do the P-CSO newsletter, but
probably a bit less frequently (maybe once a month now).
What's going to be the point of the P-CSO podcast? Basically, I want to
pull nuggets out of the book and expand on those a bit. I also want to
interview practitioners, analysts, auditors, and other security-related
folks on topics of interest. But most of all, I want to have fun and
learn some new stuff. By talking with smart folks and honing my audio
skills, I'll be able to do both.
That's it for today. Lots to do, including figuring out all these
podcast details.
Have a great weekend.
The Dutch Couple image originally uploaded
by billbarber1
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Top Security News
Now
why do NAC standards matter again?
So what? -
It was kind of nice that NAC faded into the background during Q4 a bit.
But like a phoenix rising from the depths of hell, NAC is back in early
2008. The move by the artist formerly known as Vernier's exit from the
NAC business has brought some of the market issues back into focus. I
was tooling around during my daily reading and came across this
NetworkWorld piece on the "Tech moves that matter - for good and bad."
Good isn't very interesting to me, so lo and behold, the #1 bad move in
2007? NAC. That's pretty funny. But it's actually a Joel Snyder induced
rant about NAC standards. Cisco's refusal to play nice with the TCG is
evidently a stupid move. Uh, not so much. What's in it for Cisco to
play along? Why do customers care? What value is a common NAC standard
going to provide? It's not like you are going to buy NAC gear from
multiple vendors. Microsoft had to play nice with TCG, their NAP stuff
isn't ready and won't be ready for most of this year. So that was a
Barney relationship. There is no benefit to Cisco for getting on board.
They'll have agents for all the operating systems and why would they
support heterogeneity? Not when there is too much riding on Cisco
everywhere.
Link to this
Yes, DLP is a feature
So what? -
It's a slow news day, so I'll point to another NetworkWorld piece, this one on DLP consolidation and
the market impact. It's actually more of a deal book for all the big
security vendors out there that don't have a DLP capability yet. Every
start-up is represented, so Cara (the author) must have worked really
hard to find all of these random vendors to provide comment. But
besides that minor entertainment value, we need to keep in mind that
the pace of consolidation is inconsistent with the underlying ECONOMIC
fundamentals of the DLP market. The big vendors are no longer waiting
for a market to really emerge before buying real estate. Thus every new
innovative security feature is destined to be assimilated before the
market ever gets off the ground. I guess that's a pretty obvious
conclusion to draw, but it will have an impact. There is a real
liability to being an early adopter now, knowing that sooner - rather
than later - whatever you buy will be subsumed into a bigger entity and
most likely screwed up.
Link to this
The Laundry List
- Just what we need, another pundit talking about what's going to happen in security management in 2008. Ho hum. Even when the analyst is me. - Rothman column on 2008 Security Management
- These aren't 5 immutable laws or anything, but this month's eBizQ feature is a primer on virtualization security. - The Mike Rothman Security Report
Top Blog Postings
Metrics
in a nutshell: "Absolutely accurate and utterly wrong"
Chandler is throwing himself headlong into a metrics program this year.
But here's the catch, it's not clear what to actually measure. He's
still gathering a list of "potential metrics" and trying to figure out
what's going to make the most sense. Unfortunately, he's not alone.
There is no consensus on what makes a good security metrics program,
and what should be counted. As the money quote in this post indicates, "it is entirely possible to be
both absolutely accurate and utterly wrong." Awesome, and
true. There are lots of ideas and Lindstrom and Jaquith have been
pushing theirs for years. Securitymetrics.org is at least a forum for
the discussion, but it's not clear that anything productive has come
from that effort thus far. It feels that we are spinning our wheels.
Andy's book is great, but not really actionable. It's a
thought-generator, but most security professionals don't have time to
think, they need a simple list of things to count. No list I've seen is
simple, and that's the crux of the issue.
http://thurston.halfcat.org/blog/2008/01/04/let-the-metrics-begin/
Link
to this
How'd they do that mass SQL
attack?
I was having dinner with a client on Tuesday night and he mentioned a
massive SQL injection attack that was starting to get some buzz.
LonerVamp points to it in this post and it's kind of interesting, but
not that mystifying in terms of tactics. Although the level of
automation is kind of interesting. Basically these folks did a similar
kind of analysis that Litchfield did a while back. Of
course, he didn't
leave anything malicious behind, but the concept is the same. The bad
guys build a script to find a bunch of SQL-injection vulnerable sites
(a scanner can do this, though it would need to be tuned a bit to not
raise a lot of suspicion), then they inject the malware and wait for
great stuff to happen. It's not necessarily self-propagating (like
SQL*Slammer), but it also shows that massive attacks are still quite
possible. What's a user to do? Run a scan against your Internet
accessible sites and make sure you are not vulnerable. Do pen tests
early and often. Also think about Firefox and NoScript, which would
protect client devices that navigate to these compromised websites.
http://www.terminal23.net/2008/01/mass_sql_injection.html
Link
to this
Even security hosters are
vulnerable
First it comes to light that yet another ScanAlert customer is hacked.
So much for "Hacker Safe." Now it seems that C I Host, which does
security stuff, had a data center robbed at gunpoint and a bunch of
equipment was stolen. Actually, this attack happened last year, but
it's now coming to light. Tom Olzak does an interesting post-mortem on
the attack to show where the physical security techniques left quite a
bit to be desired. I don't know a hell of a lot about physical
security, but locking the doors and windows would seem to be pretty
important. This is a DATA CENTER, after all. Yet how much do you really
know about your data center physical security? Big companies likely
control their own data centers, so you better know. But what about
small companies? I personally have no idea what physical security
structures are in place for the hosting companies I use. I've got data
replication and redundancy tactics in use to make sure I don't lose
data, and I'm not sure it's worth my time to go any deeper than that.
http://blogs.ittoolbox.com/security/adventures/archives/anatomy-of-a-physical-security-breach-21650
Link
to this
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