The Daily Incite - January 24, 2008
January 24, 2008 - Volume 3, #8
Good Morning:
I got a number of notes over the past few days wondering why I didn't
mention the G-men victory and trip to the Super Bowl. It turns out I'm
still in a state of shock. A number of folks told me they didn't have a
chance in the frozen tundra of Lambeau, and candidly sending Dallas to
the off-season was enough for me. Of course, I was rooting hard for my
boys, but I was OK with whatever the final score was.
And then the G-men won. I didn't intentionally forget to mention it on
Tuesday. With the holiday and all the other stuff floating around in my
restricted gray matter, it just didn't happen. Now the anticipation
builds. Scarily enough, a lot of the pundits are saying the G-men have
a chance. A better chance than they did against the Pack. That'll teach
you to listen to pundits. Guess they seem to forget that the Pats are
18-0. I just want
the game to be competitive.
But it brings up
a bigger thought. What is good enough? The Giants are in the Super
Bowl. Is that a good enough outcome for the season? Should I just be
happy that the team got to the Big Show?
What about with your own life and job? Many of us are "high achievers."
That means for some unknown reason we push and push and push and push
and then probably push some more. We fight against internal
expectations that don't always seem reasonable, or even
useful.
Yet we do it anyway. I know I do. I've worked for some brutal bosses in
my time. Relentless. I mean really relentless. No matter what you
accomplished, the expectation was for more. Hardly even a thank-you or
an atta-boy for super human feats.
Now I work for myself and I find my boss (that's me, not THE BOSS) to
be pretty relentless as well. I find that I can't help it. I want to
grow
more. I want to do more. I want to do it faster. I'm not sure why, but
I do.
At some point, I'm hoping to control those inner demons and learn to be
content. Not necessarily satisfied, but content with what I achieve.
Every so often I'm able to do that, certainly more now than when I had
a "job." I'm making progess, but I'm not there yet. I need to keep
working towards a balanced existence. So if the G-men win, I'll be
ecstatic. As long as the game is competitive, it'll be a good day. Even
if they get blown out, I'm going to try to be
happy also. There are 30 other teams that will be sitting on their cans
on Feb 3. My favorite team is not one of them. There is something to be
said about that.
Don't worry, be happy - and have a great weekend.
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Top Security News
All
software is vulnerable (even open source)
So what? -
Let's tip our hats to the US Department of Homeland Security for a
minute. Those folks take a lot of heat. A lot of it is deserved, but
every so often they throw their big budget around and really make a
difference. Like this project to scan a bunch of open source
software, which is described in this SC Mag article. Of
course the service provider, Coverity, found a bunch of stuff. That's
not a surprise. At least it shouldn't be. If you scan software, you'll
find holes. The even better news is that the open source projects are
taking that feedback seriously and working hard to fix things. This is
how the system gets better folks. Thanks DHS. That was money well spent.
Link to this
The maturation of IPS
So what? -
IPS has been around for a while. I mean, Stiennon is still living off
the notoriety generated by his original IDS is dead call years
ago . Joel Snyder does a pretty flattering review
of SourceFire's latest in NetworkWorld this week and it's
pretty instructive. I also recently got a pretty detailed demo of
SourceFire's
latest and integrating behavioral data, signatures, and user
information does help to narrow the scope of what security admins need
to worry about. The technology is finally maturing enough to
be useful
and helpful in building a perimeter defense. Note that I said
"perimeter defense" because I don't think it's cost effective at this
point to deploy IPS everywhere. Not with the current sensor-based
model. As IPS and NAC and LAN switches continue to merge, some
of this capability will be baked into the fabric of the network, and
then it'll make sense to deploy enterprise wide. When is that? Given
the economic backdrop, I suspect many companies will be pushing those
LAN upgrades out a bit.
Link to this
We are asking the wrong question
about NAC
So what? -
There has been a lot of NAC blasting so far in 2008. I've probably been
contributing to that a bit, although to be clear (and to pat myself on
the back), I've been saying since early 2007 that NAC was over-hyped
and will clearly disappoint. Bill Brenner comes to the conclusion that
NAC is just immature, assembling a bunch of data points to
show that folks have decided to wait before jumping headling into a NAC
implementation. But let's get back to the
fundamentals. Is host integrity checking important? Do you want to know
who and what is connecting to your network? Yes. Is access control
important? Do you want to make sure that whoever is allowed to connect
is allowed to get to only stuff they are authorized to see? Yes again.
Those are the two fundamental value propositions of NAC. Here's the
rub. NAC is not a stand-alone function. What those users were really
saying in
the article is that they don't want to build yet another security
layer. That's pretty consistent with the conversations I have. What NAC
does is important, but it needs to be built into the network
infrastructure for the capabilities to really take off.
Link to this
The Laundry List
- A Lotus branded email security box? No kidding. Lotus now rebrands some of the ISS technology to get into the spam appliance game. Seriously. They should bring that time machine to market, since they are about 5 years too late. - CRN coverage
- The Big Yellow announces strong Q4 earnings and decent guidance for 2008. International growth is the engine, and it seems they'll be spinning off some more stuff. - Reuters coverage
- CheckPoint also weighs in with a good Q4 and decent guidance. They also indicate that they'll be doing some more deals. Hmmm. Big is the new small, eh? - Check Point release
- McAfee integrates DLP and encryption into their endpoint offering. Yep, integration is happening a multiple layers of the stack. - McAfee release
Top Blog Postings
WAF
- not dead yet, actually yet another feature
Jeremiah does some good analysis of the web application firewall space
in this post. It's adjacent to what he does for a living, and I agree
that anything we can do to give the developers some breathing room
until they get a decent secure development process in place is a good
thing. So why hasn't the market taken off? As Jeremiah says,
"it’s been
around for roughly 10 years, still their market
really hasn’t taken off (roughly 1,000 deployments by my
estimates), but it hasn’t gone away either."
That could mean
a couple of things, including the products are too hard to use, the
customers don't see the value, and most likely the customers think they
are taking care of this via some other method. The real issue is that
this is a function that should happen in the perimeter firewall. In
fact, I suspect most of the perimeter vendors tell their customers they
do some of this already, even if it's pretty lame. But with the speed
of today's chips, performance is not an issue. Again, more integration.
That seems to be a common theme in 2008.
http://jeremiahgrossman.blogspot.com/2008/01/lets-talk-web-application-firewalls.html
Link
to this
It's all mainframes to me
I was actually around when mainframes ruled the world. In
my first set of technology jobs, I was a developer (it was a LOOOOOOONG
time ago) using an early PC to get terminal access to the mainframe.
That was the way things were done. Looking at Hoff's set of posts (here and below) about client
virtualization and server virtualization and NAC and the like, I just
get the sinking suspicion that we are moving back to the terminal to
host mentality. Let's step back into the time machine and think about
security back then. It was all about O/S level security and
fine-grained authorization (remember RACF and Top-Secret)? We didn't
worry much about the network because our hosts had a distinct
connection. LANs screwed that up quite a bit and the Internet blew up
the model. But if we play out this terminal/host thought, the network
is no longer relevant - as long as I know who is connecting and making
sure they only get access to the right stuff. Is that NAC?
Functionality-wise, the answer is yes. But not as the current NAC
industry delivers the product. It's more like AC. Just drop the N,
since in this world, all networks are created equal. It is about access
control, just not network access control. Yes, that's an
oversimplification, and it will take years to get there. But those that
forget history are doomed to repeat it.
http://rationalsecurity.typepad.com/blog/2008/01/client-virtuali.html
Link
to this
What? Changing your mind is not
weak?
Nitesh has a great post here about the stigma of changing our minds.
It's true. Changing direction on something is seen as being
weak. Entrepreneurs hate to admit they were wrong. The good ones do it
and live to fight another day. The bad ones fly the plane into the
mountain. Same goes for IT professionals. They make a big stink to push
a project through, and have a really hard time admitting that maybe it
wasn't the best idea. Or that they picked the wrong product or
architecture. Failing is not acceptable, and that's a problem. I like
to screw things up. And that's not just because I'm good at it and have
had a lot of practice. I've come to realize that if I'm not making
mistakes, then I'm not trying hard enough. The real key is to fail
faster. Or in Nitesh's lingo, change your mind faster. Not to the point
of flip-flopping or not seeing something through the Dip. But quickly
enough to not waste (too) much time and money.
http://www.oreillynet.com/onlamp/blog/2008/01/what_have_you_changed_your_min.html
Link
to this
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In response to “It’s all mainframes to me” … I agree with your conceptual model that client virtualization and NAC could be viewed as a way to “… know who is connecting and making sure they only get access to the right stuff”. I think this misses the additional value points of client virtualization, especially when coupled with thin clients.
Drawing parallels to database security, where sophisticated access controls, groups, roles and privileges have been in place for years, we have demonstrated that we can work around or outright breach these facilities. Addressing security concerns within a complex relational platforms is simply not possible with just access control & IDS. Users without credentials have been able to forge access rights, and ‘guest’ accounts exercise functions or view data that they should not be able to. And I am not simply talking about the more blatant SQL injection attacks (that IPS would detect), or poorly configured databases that allowed guests to run administrative features, but more subtle breaches in trust with distributed access control, indirect permissions, database links, internal & external stored procedure usage, replay attacks and many more. As a best practice, we remove many of these features and services to get rid of the risk entirely.
NAC protecting complex server and application environments, to me, offers the same benefits and detractors as Access Control on databases. NAC plus IPS closes more holes, but it does not reduce the scope of risk or complexity.
I also started my career in the twilight of punch cards and dim green ‘dumb’ terminals, I remember full well the sense of freedom that PC’s provided. A feeling akin to driving your own car after having been forced to use public transit ... but I digress. No, I am not eager to go back to that closed system model & mentality either. But I think the client virtualization is not necessarily a full return to that model as the server and network have fundamentally changed, and we have variations on what the client can look like. I think client virtualization and a thin client model offers advantages of reducing the scope of complexity, reducing the number of applications we potentially need to worry about, and reduces the number of data entry/exit points in a system. If we are protecting our IT ‘playground’, NAC gives us a fence and a gate, while Client Virtualization can do that and redefine the entire playground itself.
My .02 worth.